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One-and-a-Half Badges of Fraud
Douglas G. Baird ∗

Abstract
Lenders have long included savings clauses in loan documents
as a way to minimize exposure to fraudulent conveyance attacks. This paper suggests that scope of operation of savings
clauses is exceeding small. Those cases in which lenders find
themselves exposed to fraudulent conveyance liability are only
rarely ones in which a savings clause is of much use. Savings
clauses are useful to guard against constructive fraudulent
conveyance attacks, but only in environments in which actual
intent fraudulent conveyances attacks are also possible and for
these savings clauses do little good. Even when in environments in which they might protect a lender, uncertainties in
how they operate may restrict their usefulness, especially in
the context of guarantees.

Loan documents have long used savings clauses as a way to
minimize a lender’s exposure to a fraudulent conveyance attack.
No one thinks of them as a primary line of defense, but many assume that they provide a significant measure of protection. The
bankruptcy court in TOUSA, however, found savings clauses unenforceable, and some have feared that other courts will follow
suit. 1 In this paper, I argue that savings clauses are unlikely to
provide much comfort to secured lenders. The problem is not that
Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor, University of
Chicago Law School. The John M. Olin Fund provided research support.
1 In re TOUSA, Inc., 422 Bankr. 783 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009). In addition, the bankruptcy court expressed doubts about the efficacy of savings
clauses in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Credit Suisse
First Boston (In re Exide Technologies Inc.), 299 Bankr. 732, 750-52
(Bankr. D. Del. 2003). A comprehensive exploration of the case and the
role of savings clauses can be found in Jessica D. Gabel, The Terrible
TOUSAs: Opinions Test the Patience of Corporate Lending Practices, 27
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 415 (2011). For a characteristically insightful
theoretical analysis of this problem, see George G. Triantis, A Tussle
with TOUSA: Avoiding Fraudulent Transfers in Intercorporate Guaranties, in ANNUAL REVIEW OF INSOLVENCY LAW (2009).
∗
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the theory underlying savings clauses is suspect, but rather that
the domain in which they operate proves vanishingly small. Those
cases in which lenders find themselves exposed to fraudulent conveyance liability are only rarely ones in which a savings clause is
of much use.
Savings clauses matter only when the value the lender extends never goes to the debtor and the lender knows it. If value
goes to the debtor, there would be reasonably equivalent value
and a constructive fraudulent conveyance attack would not be
available. If the lender does not know and has no reason to know
that the money will go to someone other than the debtor, the recharacterization that makes the action against the lender possible
is unavailable. Savings clauses are irrelevant.
But when a lender knows that value is not going to its debtor,
it must be on guard that the transaction is an “actual intent”
fraudulent conveyance. If the transaction bears additional badges
of fraud, the lender is at risk. The savings clause does no good.
Part I of this paper suggests that finding these additional badges
is not likely to be hard in the relevant terrain—where the value
never goes to the debtor and the transaction leaves the debtor infinitesimally close to insolvency. A few ill-considered emails
among the debtor’s underlings may be enough to make the transaction voidable, even if the lender has never met them and never
had anything to do with them.
Part II of the paper looks at how savings clauses operate in the
context of upstream guarantees, one environment in which they
commonly appear. Here the value of the savings clause is small
because of the narrow window in which they operate. The value
transferred to the lender must be discounted by the likelihood it
will be called upon. The amount of the transfer is far less than the
face amount of the guarantee, and savings clauses matter only if
this discounted amount happens to spell the difference between
solvency and insolvency.
Part III suggests that, even in environments where they matter, the usefulness of savings clauses will turn in large measure
on the willingness of courts to interpret them flexibly. Courts,
however, are likely to insist that those who use savings clauses
cut square corners. Uncertainties in how they operate may restrict their usefulness, especially in the context of guarantees.
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SAVINGS CLAUSES

I. SAVINGS CLAUSES AND “CONSTRUCTIVE” FRAUD
Most discussions of fraudulent conveyance law draw a sharp
distinction between “constructive” fraudulent conveyances (transfers for less than reasonably equivalent value) and “actual intent”
fraudulent conveyances. The former tag even those who act with
perfect innocence, while the second reaches bad actors. This is not
quite right.
Modern fraudulent conveyance law can be traced back to
Twyne’s Case. The story is a familiar one to financial lawyers. In
1600 or thereabouts a Hampshire farmer named Pierce conveyed
his sheep to a man named Twyne. Twyne allowed Pierce to remain in possession of the sheep, to shear them, and to mark them
as his own. A creditor of Pierce’s reduced his claim to judgment
and had the sheriff try to levy on the sheep that were still in
Pierce’s hands even though they had been sold to Twyne.
A ﬁght of some kind ensued, and Edward Coke, then the
Queen’s attorney general, brought a criminal action against
Twyne, the buyer of the sheep, in the Star Chamber. 2 The court in
Twyne’s Case found the transfer of the sheep voidable, not because
one could prove that Pierce acted with actual fraudulent intent
but because badges of fraud were associated with the transaction.
A transfer of ownership without a simultaneous transfer of possession was inherently suspect. As the doctrine developed, the
badges of fraud ceased to be merely proxies for fraud that was
hard to prove and instead covered transactions that, although
perhaps not fraudulent, were ones to which creditors would object
nevertheless. 3
Twyne’s Case, 3 Coke 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601).
The Star Chamber was a court largely reserved for treason trials and
other crimes against the state. The Elizabethan fraudulent conveyance
statute provided that a share of any assets recovered went to the Crown.
The Crown had always enjoyed substantial revenue from those convicted
of treason and felony, and fraudulent conveyance law was a useful tool in
preventing traitors and felons from putting their property beyond its
reach. These concerns may explain why a case involving a creditor levying on sheep was litigated here. See GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§61–61e (rev. ed. 1940).
3 As Justice Cardozo explained in Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U.S. 348,
354 (1932), “A conveyance is illegal if made with an intent to defraud the
creditors of the grantor, but equally it is illegal if made with an intent to
hinder and delay them.”
2

3
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As fraudulent conveyance law evolved, two badges of fraud
gained particular prominence: transfers made while insolvent and
transfers for less than reasonably equivalent value. Courts regularly voided transfers that possessed these two features. They saw
no need to look for other signs of mischief. Many suspect transactions share these two badges, and innocent ones rarely do. A constructive fraudulent conveyance is merely an actual intent
fraudulent conveyance that has two badges so important that
there is no need to make further inquiry.
Because the “constructive” fraudulent conveyance is merely a
subset of “actual intent” fraudulent conveyances, the savings
clause has only limited effectiveness. Many transactions tagged as
“constructive” fraudulent conveyances today are ones that could
be set aside as an actual intent fraudulent conveyance. There are
enough additional badges, but there is no need to stop and identify them. Even when it is completely effective, a savings clause has
the effect only of partially removing one of two badges of fraud.
Rather than save a transaction, a savings clause merely requires
those bringing the action to find additional badges.
We forget at our peril that “actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud” is a term of art. When the transaction offers the debtor
no reasonably equivalent value and, by operation of the savings
clause, leaves the debtor in a hair’s breadth of being insolvent, it
simply does not take much to put the transaction over the line.
Consider first the operation of a savings clause with an unrealistically simple example. Firm approaches Bank and asks Bank
to give $100 to Firm’s Shareholder in return for Firm’s promise to
pay it $100 with interest. To support the obligation, Firm also
gives Bank a security interest in all of its assets. Bank acts in
complete good faith. Nevertheless, it is giving nothing to Firm in
exchange for the obligation that Firm is incurring and the lien it
is granting. For this reason, the transaction would be voidable if
incurring the $100 obligation renders Firm insolvent.
The savings clause protects Bank by providing that the obligation and the lien are effective only to the extent that they do not
become unenforceable under applicable law. If it happens that
Firm is solvent only to the extent of $90, then $10 of the obligation and the lien supporting it disappear. By virtue of the savings
clause, Firm incurred only an obligation to pay $90. Because this
obligation did not render it insolvent, the trustee cannot avoid
this transaction as a “constructive” fraudulent conveyance.

SAVINGS CLAUSES

But the avoidance risk remains. The absence of a business
justiﬁcation has long been a common hallmark of transactions
that are ultimately found to have sufﬁcient badges of fraud to
make them fraudulent conveyances. 4 Even transactions that
merely make the debtor’s assets less liquid can be a fraudulent
conveyance if the purpose was to hinder creditors. 5 It exists
whenever a transaction serves to keep creditors in the dark.
To know whether a transaction has sufficient badges, we need
to look at the particulars of the transaction. Assume, for example,
that in our hypothetical, completely unbeknownst to Bank,
Shareholder, the owner of Firm, confided in an email to a friend,
“For the last year, you worried that Firm might implode, but you
can rest easy. I’ve got my nuts out of this fire. The people you
should feel sorry for now are Firm’s creditors. The poor, dumb
sons of bitches.”
This email is likely enough to allow the trustee to recover the
$100 from Shareholder. Even though Firm never gave anything
directly to Shareholder, a court will recharacterize this transaction as one in which Bank first lent $100 to Firm and Firm then
gave it to Shareholder. Firm’s trustee can bring the action against
Shareholder to recover what is a virtual transfer. Courts look to
substance. 6 They routinely collapse the various steps. The issue of
collapsing various transactions usually arises in the context of a
leveraged buyout, 7 but the principles animating these opinions
apply whenever shareholders orchestrate a transaction in which
value flows from the corporation to them. 8
See, e.g., Clow v. Woods, 5 Sergeant & Rawle 275 (Pa. 1819).
See, e.g., Empire Lighting Fixture Co. v. Practical Lighting Fixture
Co., 20 F.2d 295, 297 (2d Cir. 1927) (L. Hand, J.).
6 See, e.g., Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 Bankr. 488, 502
(N.D. Ill. 1988) (“[A] court should focus not on the formal structure of the
transaction but rather on the knowledge or intent of the parties involved
in the transaction.”).
7 See, e.g., Rosener v. Majestic Management, Inc. (In re OODC, LLC),
321 Bankr. 128, 138 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005).
8 See Boyer v. Crown Stock Distribution, Inc., 587 F.3d 787, 793 (7th
Cir. 2009) (“Now whether one calls it an LBO or not is not critical. . . .
[I]f the dividend was part and parcel of the transaction that fatally depleted new Crown’s assets, it was part and parcel of a fraudulent conveyance.”).
4
5
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The simple three-party case in which the money ultimately
rests with Shareholder is one that has been heavily litigated for
decades. Collapsing the transaction to ensure that those in
Shareholder’s position are held liable is routine once the predicate
facts are made out. But once the trustee has the ability to recover
the money from Shareholder, the trustee can bring the action
against Bank as well. Moreover, this will be the trustee’s first instinct. Avoiding an obligation is much easier than bringing a
cause of action.
It matters not that Bank was as in the dark as anyone. Bank
made a transfer directly to Shareholder. When Firm promised to
repay it, Firm incurred an obligation without receiving anything
in return. As long as the debtor engaged in an “actual intent”
fraudulent conveyance, Bank is liable. Only the intentions of the
debtor are relevant in determining whether a transaction is a
fraudulent conveyance in the first instance. Good faith is a defense available to those who receive a fraudulent conveyance, but
it is available only to the extent the transferee gave value to the
debtor. In this case, the debtor is Firm, and Bank gave no value to
it.
In the typical case, Bank will give cash to Firm and then Firm
will send it upstream to Shareholder. Bank can try to argue that
it did give value to Firm on the grounds that Firm received value
in the first instance. Whether this argument works turns on
whether, from Bank’s perspective, the transaction had two steps
or only one. No action should lie against Bank if it gave $100 to
Firm and had no reason to believe that Firm would pass the money on to Shareholder. Lenders are generally not responsible for
what their debtor does with the money they lend. Everything
turns on whether Bank can keep the two steps of the transaction—the loan from it to Firm and the dividend of the loan proceeds to Shareholder—from being collapsed together.
If Bank knows that Firm will use the loan to make a dividend,
then this transaction is the same as one in which Bank conveys
the money directly to Shareholder. Collapsing the transactions
turns on whether Bank knows that the transaction is one in which
value is ultimately ending up in Shareholder’s hands, not on
whether it believes the circumstances make the dividend reasonable.
Whenever Bank needs to invoke a savings clause, it will find
itself on the precipice. Bank will find itself at best a badge of fraud
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or two short of being subject to a fraudulent conveyance attack.
Even if Bank’s motives are pure, as long as it knows that value is
not ending up with Firm—or simply not enough value—it is at
risk. The inquiry into whether a transaction is an “actual intent”
fraudulent conveyance turns on the motivations and the conduct
of the debtor. It is has nothing to do with Bank’s motives or its
knowledge of the underlying transactions.
The typical leveraged buyout may seem quite removed from
the traditional actual intent fraudulent conveyance in which
shareholders are looting the firm in the dark of night. The conventional wisdom, however, likely underestimates the realm of the
“actual intent” fraudulent conveyance. The opinions in which appellate judges who do not know any better equate “actual intent”
fraudulent conveyances with transactions involving bad behavior
give a false sense of comfort.
When value is taken out of a firm and leaves it at the very
edge of solvency, the trustee needs to find little more than a few
emails. Of course, those involved in large-scale corporate transactions should know better than to write emails reveling in their
mischief, but, as cases such as TOUSA illustrate, people can be
astonishingly loose-tongued. 9 The emails do not even need to be
from the principals. An ill-considered text message from a paralegal wannabe to a friend or co-worker is enough as long as he is
close enough to the action. It might seem that the misdeeds of
Firm should not tag lenders of new money when, notwithstanding
their due diligence, they had no inkling that anything was amiss.
But this critique of existing fraudulent conveyance law stands
quite apart from whether savings clauses do any heavy lifting.
Savings clauses might seem valuable in cases where the lenders are confident that nothing is amiss, but are worried about being second-guessed after the fact. They are financing a completely
sensible leveraged buyout, and they use savings clauses to protect
themselves from Monday-morning quarterbacking. The only risk
is that a dividend will be found a constructive fraudulent conveyance because a judge will later conclude, erroneously, that the
debtor was insolvent at the time of the transaction. Savings claus-

See In re TOUSA, Inc., 422 Bankr. 783, 794 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009)
(email by CFO characterizing transaction with a compound noun, the
first half of which was “cluster”).
9
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es do help to protect against this type of judicial error, but it is
easy to exaggerate this risk.
Whether a company is insolvent at any given moment depends
on what is known at that time, not on what is known in hindsight. 10 Today’s bankruptcy judges understand this. Those who
worked for Iridium were nicknamed “Iridiots” after the fact. The
idea that millions would buy brick-sized telephones that worked
only outdoors seemed ludicrous almost as soon as the product hit
the marketplace. Nevertheless, the judge quickly found that the
enterprise solvent when it was launched. It was enough that fully
informed investors were willing to invest in the firm’s equity and
buy its debt at par. 11
Of course, managers cannot conceal the financial condition of
the business, issue a dividend before the bad news comes, and
then assert that the business was solvent on the basis of market
data. 12 But it is exactly when managers do this that it will be easier to find other badges of fraud. Once again the savings clause
will not do any good regardless of solvency. If the managers actively mislead creditors while shoveling assets to shareholders,
the transaction is likely to be voidable whether the firm is solvent
or not.
Savings clauses originated in an era in which many bankruptcy judges lacked the sophistication of those who sit on the bench
now. Modern bankruptcy judges completely understand that the
solvency of a debtor completely turns on what is known at the
time. They know not to think that what is obvious after the fact
was obvious at the time. The change in the legal environment
means that even the judges naturally inclined to second-guessing
will have to explain why people in the past were fooled. At this
point, they need to catalogue the misdeeds that led to people being
misled. Once they do this, fairly or unfairly, they will have identified misdeeds necessary to constitute the badges of fraud that put
the transaction over the line quite apart from insolvency.

See Lippe v. Bairnco Corp., 249 F. Supp. 2d 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Statutory Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Motorola, Inc. (In
re Iridium Operating LLC), 373 Bankr. 283 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
12 VFB LLC v. Campbell Soup Co., 482 F.3d 624 (3d Cir. 2007).
10
11
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II. SAVINGS CLAUSES AND GUARANTEES
Apart from leveraged buyouts, savings clauses loom largest in
loans to corporate groups in which many individual subsidiaries
become joint and severally liable for the debts of the group. The
greater the danger that these transactions will be subject to a
fraudulent conveyance attack, the more valuable the savings
clause. This danger, however, is again easy to overstate. As long
as each subsidiary can show that they received reasonably equivalent value in exchange for issuing the guarantee, they are immune
from a “constructive fraud” fraudulent convenience attack, the only kind where savings clauses do any good.
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in TOUSA rejected the presence of reasonably equivalent value, but the articulated benefit
(putting off an inevitable bankruptcy for a few months at a cost of
hundreds of millions) was plainly insufficient. 13 Among other
things, it was based on an idea (that it is better to have restructurings later rather than sooner) that runs contrary to the conventional wisdom. Bankruptcy often comes too late, but rarely too
soon. In most cases, a much better story can be told and little
more than a plausible story is going to be required. “Reasonably
equivalent” value does not require precise calculation. It merely
needs to point to some concrete benefit of the sort that a reasonable person without creditors would expect in return for the burdens it was taking upon.
As long as the lender can make a respectable argument that
the subsidiaries guaranteeing the loan are receiving some indirect
benefit from the loan, there is reasonably equivalent value. When
the corporate group operates as a single economic entity, this is
not hard. The synergy of the corporate group itself makes essential borrowing by any one component something that is valuable
to all the other related entities. 14

In re TOUSA, Inc., 680 F.3d 1298, 1313 (11th Cir. 2012).
It is essential, however, that the benefits, when they come indirectly, are “fairly concrete.” A standard that is too low permits diversions
of value by those who possess a modicum of imagination. In re Image
Worldwide, Ltd., 139 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 1998).
13
14
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In TOUSA, the perilous condition of the business made it
highly likely that the guarantee would be triggered. 15 In the typical case, the chance that the debtor will be called upon to honor
the guarantee is quite small. This makes a big difference. The
lower the probability is, the smaller the size of the transfer to the
lender and the smaller the indirect benefit that needs to be found
to justify it. 16
Assume that Bank is making a $100 loan to Parent. There is a
one-in-ten chance that Parent will prove worthless and unable to
pay back any of the loan. When Subsidiary guarantees the loan
and gives Bank a senior lien on all its assets it is making a transfer of $10. The intuition behind that idea that the face amount of
the guarantee needs to be discounted is straightforward. 17 Instead
of giving Bank its guarantee, Subsidiary in theory could have given $10 in cash to Bank and Bank could have used the money to
find a third party to guarantee Parent’s loan.
Of course, there are many reasons why such third parties
might be hard to find, but the thought experiment makes plain
the stakes. When it received Subsidiary’s promise, Bank is getting
something that is worth only $10. Subsidiary’s guarantee brings it
no benefit in the vast majority of cases when it is never called upon. The effective cost to the other creditors of Subsidiary has to
take account of good states of the world, the ones in which incurring the obligation has utterly no effect on the creditors.
One can argue, of course, that it is too simple to discount mechanically. The fortunes of Parent and Subsidiary are closely tied
In re TOUSA, Inc., 680 F.3d 1298, 1313 (11th Cir. 2012) (collapse
of TOUSA “as foreseeable as the bombing of Nagasaki after President
Truman’s ultimatum”).
16 As Judge Sontchi observed in In re Capmark Financial Group Inc.,
438 Bankr. 471 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010), a case that also dealt with a savings clause, “The well-settled jurisprudence shows that guarantees are
liquidated based upon their probabilities of being called.” Both the Third
and the Seventh Circuit have spoken to the question. See, e.g., Mellon
Bank v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of R.M.L., Inc. (In re
R.M.L. Inc.), 92 F.3d 139, 156 (3d Cir. 1996); In re Xonics Photochemical,
Inc., 841 F.2d 198, 199–200 (7th Cir. 1988).”
17 Dean Rasmussen argued for focusing on value at the time of transfer many years ago while still in law school. See Comment, Guarantees
and Section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 194
(1985).
15
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to one another. The conditions under which the creditors are most
at risk are also those under which the guarantee is most likely to
be called upon. 18 But the baseline is the discounted value of the
guarantee. It provides a much lower hurdle than the face amount
of the guarantee itself. 19
We need to discount the obligation even further. Even if the
indirect benefit of the loan to the corporate group did not provide
reasonably equivalent value to a particular entity, whatever value
it did receive must be taken into account in assessing whether the
transaction rendered it insolvent. If the cost of the guarantee is
$10, and a less-than-reasonably-equivalent benefit of $2 was received in return, the balance sheet takes a hit only to the extent of
$8. In determining whether the transaction renders Subsidiary
insolvent, one has to take into account both the net worth of Subsidiary at the time of the transfer and the indirect benefits the
loan produces.
The imputed cost of the transfer must be reduced for still another reason. Even if called upon to honor the guarantee, Subsidiary can assert whatever rights Bank has against Parent, and it
may be able to look for contributions from other subsidiaries. Assume that each of ten subsidiaries guarantees a $100 loan that
has a one-in-ten chance of being called upon. None of them receive
any value from the loan, but Subsidiary is the only one whose solvency is in question at the time of the guarantee. Under these
facts, the only fraudulent conveyance attack is against Subsidiary
and it is available only to the extent of $1.
Such refinements do not matter in determining whether a
transaction is a fraudulent conveyance, but they are relevant in
determining whether the savings clause is going to do any significant work. Consider a simple case. Subsidiary guarantees a $100
loan to Parent that has a one-in-ten chance of not being repaid. It
See Richard Squire, Strategic Liability in the Corporate Group, 78
U. CHI. L. REV. 605 (2011).
19 Complications arise if a guarantee is made at one point and extensions of credit are made at later points in time. The moment at which the
transfer takes place for fraudulent conveyance purposes may be only at
the time the loan is made. See Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., 661 F.2d 979, 993 n.16 (2d Cir. 1981); Kenneth J. Carl, Fraudulent
Transfer Attacks on Guaranties in Bankruptcy, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109
(1986).
18
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receives nothing in return and equitable subrogation and rights of
contribution are worthless. Only if the Subsidiary has a net worth
between $0 and $10 at the time of the transfer does the savings
clause operate at all. If Subsidiary has a net worth of more than
$10, the guarantee is not a fraudulent conveyance at all in the absence of other badges of fraud. If Subsidiary is already insolvent,
the savings clause does no good.
In short, much of the justification for savings clauses rests on
the hope that they will provide security when bankruptcy judges
make mistakes. As long as guarantees are properly discounted
and indirect benefits are included in the tally, they are not likely
to be necessary. Of course, not all bankruptcy judges are equally
sophisticated. But if these judges are the ones for whom savings
clauses are intended, then one must have faith that they will look
favorably upon them. In the next part, I suggest that there are
doubts on this score as well.
III. SAVINGS CLAUSES AND CUTTING SQUARE CORNERS
The savings clause is a species of severability clause, and they
are commonplace. Legislation routinely provides that other parts
of an act remain effective even if particular parts are struck down.
Drafters of wills often use them to protect themselves against unwittingly tripping up the rule against perpetuities. 20 Severability
clauses also appear in many consumer contracts to minimize the
effect of a court striking down a particular clause:
If any provision of this Agreement shall be held illegal or
unenforceable, that provision shall be limited or eliminated to the minimum extent necessary so that this
Agreement shall otherwise remain in full force and effect
and enforceable. 21
Such clauses are enforced, but only if they are not seen as part of
a larger pattern of sharp practice. It will not save a contract that
is usurious on its face, but it will work if the interest rate turned
out to be usurious because of a computational error made in good
faith. 22
See Cattail Assocs. Inc. v. Sass, 907 A.2d 828, 840 (Md. App. 2006).
For a discussion of these severability clauses, see Omri BenShahar, Fixing Unfair Contracts, 63 STAN. L. REV. 869, 887 (2011).
22 Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. v. Kralj, 968 F.2d 500, 506 (1992).
20
21
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Severability clauses are most useful when regulators provide a
narrow path that must be followed, but then fail to mark it clearly. Without severability clauses, those who are trying to play by
the rules must seek other, perhaps much more costly ways, to conform. Hostility to savings clauses may simply complicate contracts
and increase costs without providing any benefit to consumers. 23
Nevertheless, there is something unseemly about allowing one
party to a contract to skirt on the edge of enforceability. There is
little social benefit from allowing the unscrupulous to push up
against the very limits of what is permissible. Indeed, it may have
the effect of allowing bad actors to trespass at will and face only
the risk that they will have to give back ill-gotten gains when they
are caught. A merchant can charge a usurious rate of interest,
pocket the ill-gotten gains most of the time, and use the severability clause to escape punishment in the few cases in which it is
caught. 24
Savings clauses in the context of fraudulent conveyance law
present a somewhat different problem. We worry not that a lender
is taking advantage of its debtor, but rather that the two together
are undermining the rights of the debtor’s existing creditors. It is
a mistake to assume that creditors have nothing to complain
about as long as a transaction stops short of leaving the debtor
insolvent.
When Firm remains in business, its value shifts constantly.
When Firm has liabilities of $100, creditors do not need to worry
whether the assets are worth $250 or only $200. They will be paid
in all events. By contrast, creditors are likely to worry a lot when
the value of the assets drops and comes close to $100. Whether the
value falls slightly below $100 or remains just above it is not the
point. The creditors’ loans have become much more risky. There is
a much greater chance they will not be paid. The interests of creditors are continuously compromised as the solvency/insolvency
line comes closer. To be sure, a court might well take the view
that creditors must look out for their own interests. If they want
See Ben-Shahar, supra note 21, at 906.
Swindell v. Federal National Mortgage Association, 409 S.E.2d
892, 896 (N.C. 1991) (“A lender cannot charge usurious rates with impunity by making that rate conditional upon its legality and relying upon
the illegal rate’s automatic rescission when discovered and challenged by
the borrower.”).
23
24
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protection as Firm’s condition worsens, they must bargain for a
covenant that allows them to declare a default if the solvency line
is approached, but not crossed. At the same time, however, the
judge might believe that she is under no obligation to help parties
get close to this line.
Those who engage in transactions that come as close as possible to something long considered a badge of fraud should not expect to be given much slack. Those who want savings clauses enforced need to cut square corners. A savings clause, to be effective,
has to be clear. This turns out to be easier said than done. I provide two examples of the difficulties. There are undoubtedly others.
In many transactions, there are multiple loans at the same
time. It is not unusual for each of the loans to have a savings
clause that renders the obligation ineffective to the extent that it,
combined with the debtor’s obligations, renders the firm insolvent.
But how should the losses be allocated when two loans are made
at the same time and both contain this language?
Consider the following example. Firm is solvent, but only to
the tune of $100. There is a leveraged buyout, and there are two
loans, one for $100 and one for $50. Together the two loans render
the firm insolvent. Each of the loans has a savings clause. To be
effective, the two together need to reduce Firm’s obligations by
$50, but how much does each give up? The matter would disappear if the two loans were explicit and both adopted the same allocation rule. But what should be done in the face of silence?
The court in TOUSA pointed to the absence of an allocation
rule as a ground for refusing to enforce a savings clause. From its
perspective, it had no obligation to discover a sharing rule when
the parties provided none. It might seem that the court was being
deliberately obtuse. For bankruptcy lawyers, it is second nature to
assume that, everything else being equal, loses are shared pro rata. By this logic, the party that loans $100 should have her claim
trimmed back to $67, while the one that loaned $50 should have
her claimed trimmed back to $33. But it is not so obvious. One of
the parties may have priority over another. One may have been
promised payment sooner.
Moreover, there is no reason to privilege a pro rata sharing
rule in this environment. An equally natural and logical sharing
rule is one in which the party lending $100 should have its loan
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scaled back to $75, and the one lending $50 should have its loan
scaled back to $25. There is $100 of value that must be divided
between the two parties, but one of the lenders is owed only $50
and hence can assert a right to only half of it. It has no claim
against the other half. There is $50 to which this lender lays no
claim. Hence, the lender that advanced $100 should be able to assert a right to the $50 to which the other lender has no right. Only
half of what needs to be divided is disputed, and it makes sense to
divide this equally.
Under this line of thought, the lender of $100 should have the
half to which the lender of $50 lays no claim, and the balance
should be divided equally. The $100 lender therefore receives the
uncontested part ($50) plus its share of what is contested ($25).
The $50 lender receives only its share of the contested part ($25).
This kind of division might strike bankruptcy lawyers accustomed to pro rata sharing as odd, but this way of interpreting the
savings clause is entirely logical. It can be expanded to an arbitrarily large number of parties and yield a unique solution. Moreover, its pedigree is eminently respectable. It is set out in the
Talmud. Called the “contested-garment” rule, it has been subject
to rigorous scrutiny. 25 A court could simply conclude that it was
under no obligation to choose among sharing rules when the parties themselves did not.
Of course, after the warning shot in TOUSA, one would expect
lawyers to respond to this problem, but there are likely other areas of uncertainty. Someone that believes that the savings clause
can do heavy lifting must be sure that all the bases are covered.
Another place in which savings clauses seem underspecified arises
in the context of a guarantee.
Assume once again that Subsidiary guarantees a $100 loan to
Parent and incurs a $10 hit as a result. Assume further that Subsidiary receives nothing in return for the loan, that subrogation
rights have no value, and that Subsidiary has a net worth of only
$5 at the time that it issues the guarantee. Because Subsidiary
has made a transfer worth $10 in value, it would be a fraudulent
conveyance in the absence of the savings clause. But what exactly
is the effect of the savings clause? What does it mean to say that
See Robert J. Aumann & Michael Maschler, Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud, 36 J. ECON. THEORY 195
(1985).
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the guarantee is enforceable to the extent that it does not render
Subsidiary insolvent? It might seem that the guarantee in effect is
a guarantee for only $50, rather than $100, but it is not obvious. If
a guarantee of $100 imposes a cost of $10, does it follow that a $50
guarantee imposes one half as large? A judge may reasonably decline to rewrite the contract in this fashion. Valuing actual guarantees is hard enough. Judges are under no obligation to value
hypothetical guarantees to which parties may have given no
thought. If they want a savings clause to work, the parties themselves need to specify how the obligation is to be scaled back.
IV. CONCLUSION
The challenge of savings clauses is not so much that they do
not work, but rather that the domain in which they do work is so
small. It might seem that they provide a form of cheap insurance.
Even if there are few benefits, the costs are small as well. But
there are always downsides. Some courts might (though they
should not) infer from the presence of such a clause that the debtor and the lender were thinking about how the transaction might
compromise the rights of creditors. Courts might put the presence
of such a clause on the scale when assessing whether there were
sufficient badges. There are other ways in which the savings
clause can make life harder. For example, in one case the existence of a savings clause led a debtor to resist an involuntary petition by arguing (albeit unsuccessfully) that the debts held by the
creditors with such clauses were uncertain and therefore subject
to a bona fide dispute. 26 If more such cases arise, one should start
to ask whether this game is worth the candle. In any event, it is a
mistake to take much solace from savings clauses, at least in their
present form.

26

2012).

In re Vitro Asset Corp., 2012 WL 6021475 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Douglas G. Baird
dbaird@uchicago.edu

Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics
(Second Series)
For a listing of papers 1–600 please go to Working Papers at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html
601.
602.
603.
604.
605.
606.
607
608.
609.
610.
611.
612.
613.
614.
615.
616.
617.
618.
619.
620.

621.
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.
628.
629.
630.
631.
632.
633.
634.
635.
636.
637.
638.
639
640.

David A. Weisbach, Should Environmental Taxes Be Precautionary? June 2012
Saul Levmore, Harmonization, Preferences, and the Calculus of Consent in Commercial and Other
Law, June 2012
David S. Evans, Excessive Litigation by Business Users of Free Platform Services, June 2012
Ariel Porat, Mistake under the Common European Sales Law, June 2012
Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, The Dynamics of Contrat Evolution, June 2012
Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach, International Paretianism: A Defense, July 2012
Eric A. Posner, The Institutional Structure of Immigration Law, July 2012
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Absolute Preferences and Relative Preferences in Property Law, July 2012
Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, International Law and the Limits of Macroeconomic
Cooperation, July 2012
M. Todd Henderson and Frederick Tung, Reverse Regulatory Arbitrage: An Auction Approach to
Regulatory Assignments, August 2012
Joseph Isenbergh, Cliff Schmiff, August 2012
Tom Ginsburg and James Melton, Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really Matter? A
Reevaluastion of Explanations for Judicial Independence, August 2012
M. Todd Henderson, Voice versus Exit in Health Care Policy, October 2012
Gary Becker, François Ewald, and Bernard Harcourt, “Becker on Ewald on Foucault on Becker”
American Neoliberalism and Michel Foucault’s 1979 Birth of Biopolitics Lectures, October 2012
William H. J. Hubbard, Another Look at the Eurobarometer Surveys, October 2012
Lee Anne Fennell, Resource Access Costs, October 2012
Ariel Porat, Negligence Liability for Non-Negligent Behavior, November 2012
William A. Birdthistle and M. Todd Henderson, Becoming the Fifth Branch, November 2012
David S. Evans and Elisa V. Mariscal, The Role of Keyword Advertisign in Competition among
Rival Brands, November 2012
Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz and David S. Evans, Replacing the LIBOR with a Transparent and
Reliable Index of interbank Borrowing: Comments on the Wheatley Review of LIBOR Initial
Discussion Paper, November 2012
Reid Thompson and David Weisbach, Attributes of Ownership, November 2012
Eric A. Posner, Balance-of-Powers Arguments and the Structural Constitution, November 2012
David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform
Businesses, December 2012
James Melton, Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and Kalev Leetaru, On the Interpretability of Law:
Lessons from the Decoding of National Constitutions, December 2012
Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner, Unemployment and Regulatory Policy, December 2012
David S. Evans, Economics of Vertical Restraints for Multi-Sided Platforms, January 2013
David S. Evans, Attention to Rivalry among Online Platforms and Its Implications for Antitrust
Analysis, January 2013
Omri Ben-Shahar, Arbitration and Access to Justice: Economic Analysis, January 2013
M. Todd Henderson, Can Lawyers Stay in the Driver’s Seat?, January 2013
Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Altruism Exchanges and the Kidney Shortage,
January 2013
Randal C. Picker, Access and the Public Domain, February 2013
Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, February 2013
Anup Malani and Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, February 2013
Arial Porat and Lior Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data,
February 2013
Douglas G. Baird and Anthony J. Casey, Bankruptcy Step Zero, February 2013
Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, No Contract? March 2013
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, March 2013
M. Todd Henderson, Self-Regulation for the Mortgage Industry, March 2013
Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modern Economy, April 2013
Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulation through Boilerplate: An Apologia, April 2013

641.
642.
643.
644.
645.
646.
647.
648.
649.
650.
651.
652.

653.
654.

655.

656.
657.
658.
659.
660.
661.
662.
663.
664.
665.
666.
667.
668.
669.
670.
671.
672.

Anthony J. Casey and Andres Sawicki, Copyright in Teams, May 2013
William H. J. Hubbard, An Empirical Study of the Effect of Shady Grove v. Allstate on Forum
Shopping in the New York Courts, May 2013
Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl, Quadratic Vote Buying as Efficient Corporate Governance, May
2013
Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa, and Richard H. McAdams, Punitive Police? Agency
Costs, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure, June 2013
Tom Ginsburg, Jonathan S. Masur, and Richard H. McAdams, Libertarian Paternalism, Path
Dependence, and Temporary Law, June 2013
Stephen M. Bainbridge and M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing Corporate
Boards, July 2013
Mary Anne Case, Is There a Lingua Franca for the American Legal Academy? July 2013
Bernard Harcourt, Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishments: A Mirror of the History of the
Foundations of Modern Criminal Law, July 2013
Christopher Buccafusco and Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and Incarceration: An Economic
Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property Law, July 2013
Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, The South African Constitutional Court and Socio-economic
Rights as “Insurance Swaps”, August 2013
Maciej H. Kotowski, David A. Weisbach, and Richard J. Zeckhauser, Audits as Signals, August
2013
Elisabeth J. Moyer, Michael D. Woolley, Michael J. Glotter, and David A. Weisbach, Climate
Impacts on Economic Growth as Drivers of Uncertainty in the Social Cost of Carbon, August
2013
Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl, A Solution to the Collective Action Problem in Corporate
Reorganization, September 2013
Gary Becker, François Ewald, and Bernard Harcourt, “Becker and Foucault on Crime and
Punishment”—A Conversation with Gary Becker, François Ewald, and Bernard Harcourt: The
Second Session, September 2013
Edward R. Morrison, Arpit Gupta, Lenora M. Olson, Lawrence J. Cook, and Heather Keenan,
Health and Financial Fragility: Evidence from Automobile Crashes and Consumer Bankruptcy,
October 2013
Evidentiary Privileges in International Arbitration, Richard M. Mosk and Tom Ginsburg, October
2013
Voting Squared: Quadratic Voting in Democratic Politics, Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl,
October 2013
The Impact of the U.S. Debit Card Interchange Fee Regulation on Consumer Welfare: An Event
Study Analysis, David S. Evans, Howard Chang, and Steven Joyce, October 2013
Lee Anne Fennell, Just Enough, October 2013
Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation, Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl, April 2014
Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities in Federal Sentencing, Crystal S. Yang,
October 2013
Have Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines Regime? Evidence
from Booker, Crystal S. Yang, March 2014
William H. J. Hubbard, A Theory of Pleading, Litigation, and Settlement, November 2013
Tom Ginsburg, Nick Foti, and Daniel Rockmore, “We the Peoples”: The Global Origins of
Constitutional Preambles, April 2014
Lee Anne Fennell and Eduardo M. Peñalver, Exactions Creep, December 2013
Lee Anne Fennell, Forcings, December 2013
Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, A Winner’s Curse?: Promotions from the Lower
Federal Courts, December 2013
Jose Antonio Cheibub, Zachary Elkins, and Tom Ginsburg, Beyond Presidentialism and
Parliamentarism, December 2013
Lisa Bernstein, Trade Usage in the Courts: The Flawed Conceptual and Evidentiary Basis of
Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy, November 2013
Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity versus Noninfringement, December 2013
M. Todd Henderson and William H.J. Hubbard, Do Judges Follow the Law? An Empirical Test of
Congressional Control over Judicial Behavior, January 2014
Lisa Bernstein, Copying and Context: Tying as a Solution to the Lack of Intellectual Property
Protection of Contract Terms, January 2014

673.
674.
675.
676.
677.
678.
679.
680.
681.
682.
683.
684.
685.
686.
687.
688.
689.
690.
691.
692.
693.

Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, Voting Rules in International Organizations, January 2014
Tom Ginsburg and Thomas J. Miles, The Teaching/Research Tradeoff in Law: Data from the
Right Tail, February 2014
Ariel Porat and Eric Posner, Offsetting Benefits, February 2014
Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Roles in Nonjudicial Functions, February 2014
Matthew B. Kugler, The Perceived Intrusiveness of Searching Electronic Devices at the Border:
An Empirical Study, February 2014
David S. Evans, Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, and Xinzhu Zhang, Assessing Unfair Pricing under
China's Anti-Monopoly Law for Innovation-Intensive Industries, March 2014
Jonathan S. Masur and Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, March 2014
Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, The Futility of Cost Benefit Analysis in Financial
Disclosure Regulation, March 2014
Yun-chien Chang and Lee Anne Fennell, Partition and Revelation, April 2014
Tom Ginsburg and James Melton, Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All?
Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty, May 2014
Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulations: A Response to
Criticisms, May 2014
Adam B. Badawi and Anthony J. Casey, The Fannie and Freddie Bailouts Through the Corporate
Lens, March 2014
David S. Evans, Economic Aspects of Bitcoin and Other Decentralized Public-Ledger Currency
Platforms, April 2014
Preston M. Torbert, A Study of the Risks of Contract Ambiguity, May 2014
Adam S. Chilton, The Laws of War and Public Opinion: An Experimental Study, May 2014
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Disgorgement for Accidents, May 2014
David Weisbach, Distributionally-Weighted Cost Benefit Analysis: Welfare Economics Meets
Organizational Design, June 2014
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Lapses of Attention in Medical Malpractice and Road Accidents,
June 2014
William H. J. Hubbard, Nuisance Suits, June 2014
Saul Levmore & Ariel Porat, Credible Threats, July 2014
Douglas G. Baird, One-and-a-Half Badges of Fraud, August 2014

